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EDUCATING PROSECUTORS AND SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES ABOUT BRADY V. MARYLAND
By Bennett L. Gershman *
Connick v. Thompson,' by any reckoning, is a deeply
disturbing, even unconscionable decision.2 The majority opinion
by Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito, vacated a $14 million jury award to
John Thompson, who spent 18 years in prison (14 years isolated
on death row) and was a few weeks from being executed for
crimes he did not commit. He lost much of his life because a team
of four prosecutors in the New Orleans District Attorney Harry
Connick's office violated Brady v. Maryland3 by deliberately
hiding evidence that would have proven Thompson's innocence.
As one of the prosecutors told Thompson: "I'm going to fry you.
You will die in the electric chair."4 The jury heard testimony that
Connick's office had one of the worst records in the United States
for concealing exculpatory evidence from defendants,5 and an
Professor Bennett Gershman is a faculty member at Pace Law School and has
taught as a visiting professor at Cornell Law School and Syracuse Law School.
1. 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
2. Commentary on the case has been highly critical. See, e.g., Editorial, Failure
of Empathy and Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2011, at A26; Lincoln Caplan, The D.A.
Stole His Life, Justice Took His Money, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2011, at 11; Editorial, A
wrong decision by the Supreme Court on civil rights, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2011, at 16;
Editorial, When Prosecutors Err, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2011, at A16; Editorial, A Civil
Rights Divide, N.Y.L.J., May 2, 2011, at 22; Dahlia Lithwick, Cruel but Not Unusual,
SLATE, Apr. 1, 2011, available at http://www.slate.com/articles/newsand-politics/
jurisprudence/2011/04/cruelbutnotunusual.html; Elkan Abramowitz & Barry A.
Bohrer, 'Brady' Obligations in the Twenty-First Century, N.Y.L. J., May 3, 2011, at 1;
Tony Mauro, Stevens Criticizes Ruling on Immunity Analysis For Prosecutors, THE
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 5, 2011, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/pa/Pub
ArticlePA.jsp?id=1202493002606; Vivian Berger, No Recompense for John
Thompson's Stolen Years, NAT'L L.J., June 20, 2011.
3. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
4. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 1374 n. 7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 1384 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The jury learned of several Brady
oversights in Thompson's trials and heard testimony that Connick's Office had one of
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office culture that was deliberately indifferent to the rights of
defendants, especially in training and supervising prosecutors on
compliance with Brady.6 Indeed, the jury's verdict in
Thompsons's civil rights lawsuit, affirmed by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, was based on Connick's failure to train and
supervise his assistants on Brady.'
Moreover, this was not the first time the Court reviewed
unconstitutional conduct by Connick's prosecutors. In Kyles v.
Whitley, decided in 1995, the Court reversed a capital murder
conviction that was prosecuted at the same time as Thompson's
case. 8 In Kyles, the Court found that prosecutors in Connick's
office had concealed several pieces of exculpatory evidence that
would have proven the defendant's innocence.9 Around the time
of Thompson's and Kyles's prosecutions, the Louisiana Supreme
Court reversed several convictions obtained by Connick's office
for Brady violations."o The jury found not only that Connick failed
to train and supervise his assistants on compliance with Brady,
but that Connick enabled prosecutors in his office to conspire
about how to violate Brady, and how to get away with it."
No one disputed that prosecutors in Connick's office violated
Brady in prosecuting Thompson for armed robbery and capital
murder. Connick conceded that his assistants failed to disclose to
Thompson a swatch of fabric taken from the robbery victim's
the worst Brady records in the country.").
6. See infra notes 18-41 and accompanying text.
7. The theory of Thompson's civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was that
Connick was liable for failing to train assistants in his office concerning their Brady
obligations and that this failure showed a "deliberate indifference to the rights of
persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into contact."
8. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
9. The Court also noted that prosecutors probably engaged in improper witness-
coaching to cover up their suppression. Id. at 443. The prosecutors also probably
planted false evidence. Id. at 446.
10. State v. Hammler, 312 So. 2d 306 (La. 1975); State v. Carney, 334 So. 2d 415
(La. 1976); State v. Falkins, 356 So. 2d 415 (La. 1978); State v. Curtis, 344 So. 2d 396
(La. 1980); and State v. Perkins, 423 So. 2d 1103 (La. 1982).
11. Justice Scalia dissented in Kyles, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas.
Scalia's opinion seems so disconnected to the massive evidence in the record of
outrageous misconduct by the prosecutors as to defy logic, and his opinion is
skewered in the majority opinion. It would appear that Justice Scalia wishes that
Brady did not exist, and that District Attorney's offices - even ones like Connick's -
should not be "micromanaged" by the judiciary. See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1363.
However, Brady is the law, and the judiciary does have a responsibility to protect the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants.
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clothing that was stained by the perpetrator's blood; the blood
was tested and established that the perpetrator blood was type
B. 1 2 Thompson's blood is type O."a The prosecutors failed to
disclose the swatch or the test results." The jury also learned
that in Thompson's murder trial, the prosecutors exploited the
nondisclosure in the robbery case by deliberately switching the
order of the robbery and murder trials to obtain the robbery
conviction first - made much more likely in view of the
suppressed blood evidence - and to improve their chances of
getting a murder conviction and death sentence, ultimately a
successful strategy.1 5  Additionally, the jury learned that
prosecutors in the murder trial suppressed several items of
exculpatory evidence that would have proven Thompson had been
misidentified.16 From all of this evidence, the jury was entitled to
find, as it did, that Connick, as the policy maker for the District
Attorney's office, was deliberately indifferent to the need to train
prosecutors about their disclosure obligations, and that the lack
of training caused the violation of Thompson's constitutional
rights. "7
The jury learned the following about the level of training of
prosecutors in Connick's office with respect to Brady, and about
their resulting understanding and compliance with Brady:
Connick acknowledged that his understanding of Brady was
deficient.' 8
Connick acknowledged that he once violated Brady by
withholding a lab report and was indicted by the U.S. Attorney
for doing it.' 9
12. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1371 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) The strategy of the prosecutors was twofold:
first, getting the robbery conviction would deter Thompson from testifying at the
murder trial because the robbery conviction could be used to impeach his credibility,
and second, the armed robbery conviction could be used at the penalty phase of the
capital murder trial to support the prosecution's argument for the death penalty.
16. Id. at 1371 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that among the items suppressed
was evidence that the perpetrator was six feet tall with "close cut hair;" Thompson is
five feet eight inches tall, and at the time of the murder styled his hair in a large
"Afro").
17. See Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
18. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1378 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
19. Id.
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Connick demonstrated his lack of understanding of Brady by
suggesting at trial that the inadvertent failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence was not a Brady violation.2 0
One of Thompson's prosecutors, Eric Dubelier, admitted that
he never reviewed police files but relied on the police to alert him
to any Brady information.2 1
Another of Thompson's prosecutors, Jim Williams, stated
that evidence that could be used to impeach a witness to show he
was lying was not covered by Brady.2 2
Thompson's expert opined that the testimony of high-
ranking officials in Connick's office exposed glaring errors in
understanding and applying Brady.2 3
Dubelier's and Williams's testimony at the civil rights trial
further exposed their lack of understanding of evidence that
would be considered "favorable" to the accused under Brady.24
Connick conceded that training in his office with respect to
Brady was inadequate, and that he had instituted no procedures
to monitor compliance with Brady.2 5
Because of a "huge turnover" in Connick's office, many of his
prosecutors "were coming fresh out of law school" and attorneys
with little experience quickly advanced to supervisory positions.2 6
The lead prosecutors in Thompson's case, Dubelier and
Williams, "were two of the highest ranking prosecutors in the
office, yet neither man had even five years experience as a
prosecutor."2 7
20. Id. See infra Appendix, Brady Training Program, Class 1. The Brady Rule.
21. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1378 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See infra Appendix,
Brady Training Program, Class 1. Prosecutor's Knowledge - Actual and
Constructive.
22. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See infra Appendix, Brady Training Program,
Class 1. The Brady Rule.
23. Id. at 1378-79 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 1379 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Dubelier, for example, testified that the
description of the perpetrator as six feet tall with close cut hair was "not inconsistent
with Thompson's appearance" (Thompson was five feet eight inches tall with hair
styled in a large "Afro"). See infra Appendix, Brady Training Program, Class 1.
Favorable Evidence.
25. Id. at 1379.
26. Id.
27. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1379 (2011)
520 [Vol. 13
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Dubelier and Williams testified "that they did not recall any
Brady training in Connick's office."2 8
Connick relied on supervisory prosecutors like Dubelier and
Williams to ensure compliance with Brady, but Connick did not
ascertain whether the supervisory prosecutors themselves
understood the importance of training new prosecutors about
Brady.29
Connick never communicated to his assistants the
importance of disclosing evidence that could establish a
defendant's innocence.o
Michael Riehlmann, one of the prosecutors who knew about
but never disclosed the Brady violations in Thompson's case,
could not recall ever being instructed or trained about his Brady
obligations. 31
Bruce Whittaker, another of the Thompson prosecutors,
testified that it was possible for "inexperienced lawyers just a few
weeks out of law school with no training" to bear responsibility
for whether evidence was Brady material and had to be
disclosed.32
Prosecutors would go to Connick with Brady questions, but
Connick acknowledged that he "stopped reading law books... and
looking at opinions" when he was elected District Attorney. 33
Further, as Thompson's expert testified, Connick's supervision
regarding Brady was "the blind leading the blind."34
A survey of prosecutors in Connick's office "revealed that
more than half felt they had not received the training they
needed to do their jobs."3 5
"Louisiana did not require continuing legal education at the
time of Thompson's trials."3 6
28. Id. at 1379-80.
29. Id. at 1380.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1380.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1381.
2012] 521
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The Office policy manual contained four sentences on Brady
that were inaccurate, incomplete, and outdated. The manual
omitted any reference to impeachment evidence as Brady
material that prosecutors are obligated to disclose.
The manual omitted any reference to several significant
developments in the Court's Brady jurisprudence.37
During the period of Thompson's trials, the Louisiana
Supreme Court issued dozens of opinions discussing Brady and at
least four decisions in which it reversed convictions because of
Brady violations by Connick's office.38
When asked about his office's prosecution in the Kyles case,
which involved numerous Brady violations, Connick testified that
"he was satisfied with his Office's practices, and saw no need to
make any changes."3 9
Connick resisted any effort to hold offending prosecutors
accountable for their misconduct because he felt it would "make
[his] job more difficult." 4 0
Connick "never disciplined or fired a single prosecutor for
violating Brady."41
Despite this evidence, the Supreme Court held that the
Office's training in Brady was not deficient, and that prosecutors
were adequately trained about Brady.42 In fact, the Court ruled
37. Id. The Office manual's reference to Brady states in full:
In most cases, in response to the request of defense attorneys, the Judge orders the
state to produce so-called Brady material - that is, information in the possession of
the State which is exculpatory regarding the defendant. The duty to produce Brady
material is ongoing and continues throughout the trial. Failure to produce Brady
material has resulted in mistrials and reversals, as well as extended court battles
over jeopardy issues. In all cases, a review of Brady issues, including apparently self-
serving statements made by the defendant, must be included in a pre-trial conference
and each Assistant must be familiar with the law regarding exculpatory information
possessed by the State.
Also, important Brady cases decided by the Court during the relevant period (and not
mentioned) in the the Connick Office Manual included United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667 (1985), Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977), and United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
38. Supra note 9.
39. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1382 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1357 ("it was undisputed at trial that the prosecutors were familiar
522 [Vol. 13
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that no such training was even necessary. According to the
majority, prosecutors are lawyers, and lawyers are presumed to
know the law. Lawyers do not require the kind of specialized
training in constitutional law, for example, that a police officer
might need when faced with a difficult, "split-second" decision on
whether to shoot at a fleeing felon.4 3 The majority also found that
Connick was not on notice that there were deficiencies in his
office with respect to educating his assistants on Brady.
According to the majority, the several reversals by the Louisiana
Supreme Court of convictions by Connick's office based on
violations of Brady, as noted above, "could not have put Connick
on notice that the office's Brady training was inadequate with
respect to the sort of Brady violation at issue here."4 4 According to
the majority's reasoning, the basis for the Brady reversals by the
Louisiana Supreme Court did not involve nondisclosure of
scientific evidence, as did Thompson's case.45 For these decisions
to alert Connick to the need to educate his prosecutors on Brady,
the Brady violation would have had to involve the exact same
type of nondisclosure of scientific evidence.4 6
But the lowest, most disheartening part of the majority's
opinion was its observation that there is no "obvious need for
specific legal training" of prosecutors in interpreting and applying
Brady.47 As noted above, the overwhelming evidence at trial,
accepted by a jury and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, showed
that Connick's office utterly disregarded the requirements of
Brady. The majority rejected all of this evidence, and invented a
version of Connick's office that bears no resemblance to reality.
According to the majority, "it is undisputed . . . that the
prosecutors in Connick's office were familiar with the general
with the general Brady requirement"); Id. at 1363 ("it is undisputed here that the
prosecutors in Connick's office were familiar with the general Brady rule").
43. Connick, 131 S. Ct at 1361-63. The reference to police training is found in
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989).
44. Id. at 1360.
45. Id.
46. Presumably, if one of those Louisiana decisions reversed a conviction based on
the nondisclosure by one of Connick's prosecutors of a specific type of blood evidence -
type A, for example - the majority might have asserted (with a straight face) that this
decision could not have put Connick on notice that his office's training was
inadequate because the Brady violation at issue in Thompson's case involved types B
and 0 blood evidence, and therefore the nondisclosure cited by the Louisiana
Supreme Court is "not similar to the violation at issue here."
47. Id. at 1361.
2012] 523
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Brady rule."4 8 Moreover, held the Court, under Connick's "regime
of legal training and professional responsibility," prosecutors
understood the Brady rule, and understood how to go about
implementing Brady's disclosure requirements.4 9
Given the abundant proof of a pervasive culture of ignorance
and inattention to Brady in Connick's office,so the majority's
assertion that Connick's training of prosecutors was adequate
and appropriate is either mind-boggling or disingenuous.
According to the majority's simplistic syllogism, lawyers are
trained in the law, prosecutors are lawyers, and therefore
prosecutors know the law, including the Brady rule. Elaborating
on this flawed reasoning, the majority asserted that prosecutors
do not need Brady training because they are equipped with the
tools to interpret and apply legal principles, understand
constitutional limits, and exercise legal judgment.5 1 After all,
explained the majority, "all attorneys [including prosecutors]
must graduate from law school or pass a substantive
examination."52 Even more impressively, the majority asserted,
attorneys in most jurisdictions, including prosecutors, must
"satisfy continuing-education requirements,"5 3 although the
majority failed to note that Louisiana did not require any
continuing legal education at the time of Thompson's trials.54
Moreover, the majority asserted, prosecutors in Connick's office
received "train[ing] on the job," and were informed of "court
decisions and instructional memoranda" and were "[kept] ...
abreast of relevant legal developments."5 There was no evidence
that any of this so-called "training" included Brady, and indeed,
the evidence was to the contrary. Finally, the majority observed,
48. Id. at 1363.
49. Id. The majority also asserted that prosecutors in Connick's office received "on
the job" training, and attorneys in the office "circulated court decisions and
instructional memoranda." Id. The majority did not say whether the on the job
training and circulation of court decisions and instructional materials had anything
to do with Brady.
50. See supra notes 7-66 and accompanying text.
51. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1361.
52. Id. The majority did not explain how this assertion was relevant to the
conduct of prosecutors in Connick's office.
53. Id. at 1362.
54. Id. at 1362, 1381.
55. Id. at 1362. There is no evidence that any of these materials or instruction
dealt with Brady issues.
56. The Court had decided several important Brady cases during the relevant
time period, but there was no evidence that Connick's prosecutors were familiar with
[Vol. 13524
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Connick's prosecutors had to satisfy character and fitness
standards and were subject to "an ethical regime designed to
reinforce the professional standards."5 ' Thus, the majority
concluded, "in light of this regime of legal training and
professional responsibility," Brady violations are neither the
"obvious consequence" of a failure of training, nor does a
prosecutor making Brady decisions present the same '"highly
predictable' constitutional danger" as an untrained police
officer.5 8
It is hard to take the majority's explanation seriously.
Anyone even remotely familiar with Brady's ethical rule
requiring a prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence to the
defense has to view this portion of the majority's opinion as
absurdly disconnected to the reality of Brady litigation in the
U.S., and certainly to its implementation in Connick's office. The
majority does not understand the difficult challenges a prosecutor
faces when analyzing evidence and making Brady decisions. The
majority's glib assertion - "Well, they're lawyers, and lawyers
should know the law"5 9 - suggests that these Justices do not even
appreciate the Court's own history in struggling with Brady
questions. Indeed, given the Court's many contested decisions on
difficult Brady questions,6 0 one would think that the Court would
be sensitive to the complexities of Brady, and the difficulties
facing prosecutors in making Brady determinations. 6 1 One would
not expect the Court to be so self-confident and cavalier about the
ability of prosecutors to know the law of Brady and apply it
correctly.
Finally, although Justice Scalia's concurring opinion, joined
by Justice Alito, did not focus heavily on Brady training, it did
make several references to the inevitability of Brady "mistakes"
and "supposed gaps and deficiencies" in training.62 To be sure, the
any of these cases. See id. at 1381 n.16 (dissenting opinion).
57. Id. at 1362. The majority cites to no evidence that attorneys in Connick's
office had a clue about prevailing ethical standards in general, or specific ethical
standards dealing with Brady. See infra Appendix, Brady Training Program,
Required Reading, Professional Norms.
58. Id. at 1363. This statement is a reference to Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
390 n.10 (1989).
59. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1362.
60. See infra, note 60 and accompanying text.
61. See infra Appendix, Brady Training Program.
62. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1366-67 (Scalia, J., concurring).
2012]1 525
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flagrant conduct of Thompson's prosecutors, as well as the
flagrant Brady violations in several of the Court's recent
decisions, were clearly not "mistakes."6 3 Further, Justice Scalia's
bold assertion that there was no Brady violation in Thompson's
case, reveals a misguided understanding of Brady, and a warped
understanding of a prosecutor's ethical responsibilities. Scalia
suggested that prosecutors can avoid their Brady obligation by
intentionally remaining ignorant of the existence of exculpatory
evidence, as he suggests the prosecutors did in Connick. 64 If
nothing else, Scalia's gambit - which might be called "I've Got a
Secret," or "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" - can only encourage
prosecutors to subvert their Brady obligation by deliberately
failing to collect or test potentially exculpatory evidence."5 Under
Scalia's perverse gamesmanship, if a prosecutor chooses not to
learn about exculpatory evidence, then the prosecutor is not
obligated to disclose what he doesn't know. But as the dissent
points out, Scalia's view of Brady is not the law.6 6 Nor is it
consistent with professional ethical standards.6 1
Further belittling the need for a training program for Brady,
the majority asserted that Connick could not be shown to be
"deliberately indifferent" to protecting Thompson's constitutional
rights training because the cases only involved one "single Brady
violation." Once again, the majority misrepresented the record to
reach its bizarre result. First, the exculpatory blood evidence
suppressed by prosecutors in the robbery trial was not the only
evidence that Thompson's prosecutors suppressed. During the
63. See infra Appendix, Brady Training Program, Relevant Supreme Court
Decisions and accompanying text.
64. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1369 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("the best kept secret of
this case [is] there was probably no Brady violation at all - except for Deegan's").
65. For a discussion of Brady gamesmanship by prosecutors, See Bennett L.
Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 531 (2007).
66. Whether a prosecutor has actual knowledge is irrelevant since a prosecutor is
charged with constructive knowledge of evidence in the possession of all entities
involved in the investigation and prosecution of the case. See infra Appendix, Brady
Training Program, Class 1. Actual and Constructive Knowledge.
67. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 3-3.11(c) (3d ed.1993) ("A
prosecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence because he or she
believes it will damage the prosecution's case or aid the accused."). See also
commentary ("A prosecutor may not properly refrain from investigation in order to
avoid coming into possession of evidence that may weaken the prosecution's case,
independent of whether disclosure to the defense may be required. The duty of the
prosecutor is to acquire all the relevant evidence without regard to its impact on the
success of the prosecution.").
[Vol. 13526
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civil trial, the jury learned that the prosecutors suppressed
several other items of exculpatory evidence in Thompson's
murder trial. 8 Second, to characterize the violation as an isolated
deviation is disingenuous. Surely when a group of four
prosecutors, with a fifth prosecutor aware of the violation,
knowingly hides a critical piece of evidence that could prove a
defendant's innocence - a blood swatch containing the
perpetrator's blood and then exploits that suppression to make it
easier to obtain a murder conviction (which also involved the
suppression of exculpatory evidence), and thereafter prevents the
defendant from discovering the evidence by removing it from the
property room, such conduct cannot honestly be labeled a "single"
violation. The Court shockingly marginalizes the conduct and
minimizes the five prosecutors' joint and individual culpability.
But even accepting the majority's misleading
characterization, there is still no basis for the majority's
assertion, without any explanation, that a single Brady violation
may not be sufficient to prove that Connick acted with deliberate
indifference by failing to train his assistants on Brady. The
majority cites the oft-quoted footnote in Canton v. Harris,6 9 to
justify its assertion that a single constitutional violation cannot
demonstrate deliberate indifference based on failure-to-train
liability, i.e., that a pattern of constitutional violations is
necessary. 70 In fact, the Canton Court actually suggested that in
a limited class of cases a single violation could suffice for §1983
liability. Canton posed the hypothetical of a city that arms its
police force with firearms but does not train the police on the
constitutional limits of using deadly force to capture fleeing
felons.7 2 In such cases, one unlawful killing is sufficient to
establish liability because given the "known frequency" of the
police attempting to arrest fleeing felons, it is "highly predictable"
that police will violate constitutional rights without specific
training in the use of firearms.73 Contrary to the Court's holding
68. Supra note 9.
69. Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989).
70. See Bd. of Comm'rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997).
71. 489 U.S. at 390 n.10.
72. Id.
73. One could persuasively dispute whether the actions of a team of five police
officers, without constitutional justification, in firing their guns at several persons
seated in a moving vehicle, should be characterized as a "single violation." See Joseph
Goldstein, Police Trial Begins for Officers in Bell Shooting; Two Offer to Retire, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 25, 2011, at A24 (five police officers involved in shooting at driver and
2012]1 527
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in Connick, the same predictability exists with Brady, whose
application is required in almost every prosecution, and whose
violation can predictably have disastrous results.74
Moreover, the Canton hypothetical is a dubious example to
use to analyze failure-to-train liability. First, the example is so
extreme as to be totally unrealistic; no police department
anywhere in the United States fails to train its police officers on
the permissible use of deadly force in apprehending fleeing felons.
Indeed, the likelihood of police officers not trained in the use of
firearms is infinitely less likely than the failure of a policy maker
like Connick to train his employees to comply with Brady.
Moreover, according to the majority, police need training because
they "must sometimes make split-second decisions with life-or-
passengers seated inside moving vehicle).
74. See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 11, 1999, at 3 (reporting that of 11,000 homicide convictions between 1963 and
1999, 381 of those convictions were reversed for Brady violations); CAL. COMM'N ON
THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON REPORTING
MISCONDUCT 2-3 (2007) (examining 2,130 California cases raising claims of
prosecutorial misconduct over ten-year period ending in 2006, and finding
misconduct in 443 of those cases, with Brady violations the most common form of
misconduct); JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL
CASES, 1973-1995 5 (2000), available at http://www2.law.columbia.edulinstructional
services/liebman/liebmanfinal.pdf (noting that prosecutorial suppression of
exculpatory evidence accounted for 16% to 19% of reversible errors); Hugo Adam
Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40
STAN. L. REV. 21, 23-24, 57 (1987) (finding that thirty-five of 350 wrongful capital
convictions resulted from prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence). Most of
the post-Brady decisions of the United States Supreme Court addressing a
prosecutor's nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence occurred in capital cases.
See STEVE WEINBERG, BREAKING THE RULES: WHO SUFFERS WHEN A
PROSECUTOR IS CITED FOR MISCONDUCT? 3-4 (2003) (citing a study of over 11,000
cases in which allegations of misconduct by prosecutors were reviewed by the
appellate courts and noting that in twenty-eight cases involving thirty-two
defendants misconduct by prosecutors, including suppression of exculpatory
evidence, led to the conviction of innocent persons); United States v. Jones, 620 F.
Supp. 2d 163, 170 (D. Mass. 2009) (noting that "in response to a disturbing number
of wrongful convictions resulting in death sentences, in 2002 the Illinois Commission
on Capital Punishment recommended that the Illinois Supreme Court "adopt a rule
defining 'exculpatory evidence' in order to provide guidance to counsel in making
appropriate disclosures"); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to
Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 8 U.D.C. L. REV. 275, 281-282 (2004) (noting
seventy-two reported cases of prosecutorial misconduct from the Bronx District
Attorney's Office between 1975-1996, eighteen of which involved reversals of
convictions based on prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence); Bennett L.
Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 688 n.18 (2006)
(citing several cases in which innocent persons were convicted based in part on the
prosecutor's suppression of exculpatory evidence).
Educating Prosecutors
death consequences."7 5 In reality, it is unreasonable to believe
that intensive training in the constitutional limits on using
firearms will be helpful when police have to make split-second
decisions on whether to shoot to kill. Presumably police faced
with an imminently dangerous situation will not be able to review
training manuals or study constitutional law. Prosecutors, on the
other hand, have considerable time to study the facts and get the
law correct when they decide whether constitutional and ethical
rules require disclosure of evidence. Prosecutors don't have to
make "split-second decisions" about Brady. Thus, training
obviously can assist a prosecutor in making a correct, and
certainly an informed, decision.
Finally, prosecutors need to be educated that it is highly
predictable-even obvious-that a mistake in analyzing a case
file and deciding whether to disclose exculpatory evidence may
have profound consequences on a defendant's ability to effectively
defend himself and receive a fair trial. Prosecutors well know, to
use the majority's terminology with respect to police conduct, that
a decision not to disclose Brady evidence can have "life-or-death
consequences," as it literally did in Thompson's case.
The majority's failure to appreciate the kinds of Brady
questions that prosecutors typically confront appears to be the
result of several misunderstandings. First, the majority's
reasoning fails to take into account the fact that Brady questions
are pervasive and recurrent, involve complex fact-specific
balancing, and require an enhanced understanding of various
legal rules that both restrict and enlarge the disclosure duty.
Second, the majority apparently did not understand the inherent
tensions in Brady that make even the most honest and
conscientious ones resist making Brady disclosures." Third, the
majority did not seem to appreciate that the likely consequence of
an incorrect Brady determination-a material nondisclosure
would likely be the wrongful conviction of an innocent person.
To be sure, the kinds of Brady violations reviewed by the
Court in several recent decisions - Kyles v. Whitley," Banks v.
Dretke," Youngblood v. West Virginia," Cone v. Bell"o - were
75. Id.
76. See infra Appendix, Brady Training Program, Class 2. Cognitive Biases.
77. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
78. 540 U.S. 668 (2004).
79. 547 U.S. 867 (2006).
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relatively easy Brady cases. In each of these cases, intelligent and
responsible prosecutors could certainly recognize each required
disclosure under Brady. However, the fact that prosecutors did
not disclose the evidence in those cases - and those cases are
merely a tiny fraction of disclosure violations by prosecutors
nationwide-suggests that Brady violations are widespread, that
Brady can easily can be evaded, and that educating prosecutors
about compliance with Brady is important. To characterize the
Court's Brady jurisprudence as "nuances," as the majority does,
marginalizes Brady and its progeny.81 Nor, as the majority
suggests, do these cases represent "gray areas"82-areas too
sophisticated or unusual to be the subject of training. These
cases, in fact, illustrate clear-cut situations in which prosecutors
deliberately neglected their Brady obligations.83
80. 129 S. Ct. 769 (2009).
81. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1363 (2011).
82. Id. at 1365.
83. Connick v. Thompson, Oral Argument, Oct. 6, 2010, at 12-15 (2010 WL
3907898 (U.S.).
A clue to the majority's attitude concerning the need and extent of educating
prosecutors about complying with Brady - the central issue in Connick - may be
gleaned from examining portions of the oral argument dealing with Brady training.
The issue was addressed by several Justices, who repeatedly pressed Mr. Thompson's
lawyer, J. Gordon Cooney, to articulate the specific types of training prosecutors
would need in order to ensure compliance with Brady. The questions included the
following:
Justice Alito: Yes, if you could-could you just say as succinctly as possible what you
would tell assistant district attorneys if you were the district attorney for this
jurisdiction, and you with the benefit of hindsight, having seen this case, what kind
of - what would you tell them they should do with respect to Brady?
Justice Alito: I really would appreciate it if you'd get to my question. Brady requires
that exculpatory evidence be turned over. Now, do you - do you think the assistant
prosecutors didn't even know that?
Justice Alito: Okay. Now, you phrase - you are the instructor. You phrase the lesson
that you think is required by Brady that has to be given to them.
Chief Justice Roberts: You are the - you're the new D.A. and you are putting up - I
need to instruct my people. What - what do they instruct on? I know they instruct on
Brady under your view. What else?
Chief Justice Roberts: Well, we are - we are looking at specifics where they are going
to violate the Constitution. I think that's a good thing, to tell them they have an
obligation to protect the innocent. But we are worried about violations of our
constitutional requirements. We know Brady is one. What is the next one? What is
day 2 in the course?
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Surely, there are dozens of ways to structure a rigorous and
comprehensive Brady training program in terms of coverage,
intensity, and format. Thompson's lawyer tried to offer one
during oral argument in the Supreme Court but the Justices
apparently weren't interested. 84  The Brady Training Program,
sketched out in the Appendix, is one such approach. It covers the
Brady jurisprudence and recurring Brady issues comprehensively
in four sessions. It responds to the Connick majority's myopic
understanding of the need for a Brady training program and the
contents of that program. It provides a blueprint for thinking
about how easy and effective it would be to educate prosecutors to
carry out their professional obligations in a responsible and
ethical way.
FINAL THOUGHTS
The majority's discourse in Connick on educating prosecutors
about Brady was unfortunate: superficial, simplistic, and
unrealistic. Brady determinations by prosecutors frequently
represent difficult questions that require a careful examination of
Justice Alito: I mean, with respect, I really don't, as a young district - assistant
district attorney, that you have told me anything that's going to be really helpful to
me other than, you know, follow the law, which you certainly should do, in dealing
with my obligation to turn over physical evidence, which is what's involved here.
Several points should be noted. First, these questions appear to minimize and
understate the type of training program that prosecutors would need to understand
the Brady rule and make intelligent Brady decisions. Moreover, it is difficult for any
attorney to compress into a few sentences the substance of an effective Brady
training program accurately and intelligently, just as it would be difficult for any
attorney to articulate in a few sentences the components of a judicial training
program dealing with prohibited conflicts of interest. Justice Alito asks the lawyer to
"phrase the lesson that you think is required by Brady" Chief Justice Roberts asks:
"They instruct on Brady. What else. What is Day 2 in the course?" When Thompson's
lawyer attempts to provide a thoughtful response that prosecutors initially should be
instructed to closely examine the file and think in advance of what evidence might be
favorable, Justice Alito interjects: "[Y]ou haven't told me anything that's helpful
except follow the law." Regrettably, the questions from these Justices - rhetorical,
confusing, argumentative, perhaps disingenuous - suggest that these Justices do not
understand whether a Brady training program is necessary, and what it should look
like.
84. Id. at 13. Thompson's attorney, J. Gordon Cooney, stated:
I think at a minimum it has two pieces, Your Honor. It has basic instruction about
how to go about fulfilling the Brady obligation, and how do you go about looking
through the file to make sure you know what's there, making sure you have
documents that are in the possession of the police. Thinking in advance, as this
Court talked about in the Agurs case, about what the evidence is going to be at trial
and looking thoughtfully at that evidence to determine whether or not the evidence
was favorable to the accused and needs to be produced.
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the evidence in the case file, a solid understanding of the several
and often difficult-to-apply Brady rules, and a mindset that
struggles to maintain an objective and neutral stance and avoid
the understandable advocate's impulse against disclosure. And
despite the majority's unwillingness to recognize the practical
consequences of Brady determinations, it is obvious that a
prosecutor's decision on whether to disclose exculpatory evidence
may cause a possibly-innocent defendant to be prosecuted,
convicted, and punished." Despite the majority's cavalier
attitude about a lawyer's ability to know the law, it is also
obvious that educating prosecutors about Brady is indispensable
to preventing constitutional violations.
Connick is a regrettable decision, for John Thompson, of
course, as well as for those who are concerned about the capacity
of prosecutors to behave responsibly, and the availability of civil
remedies to offer relief to those persons wrongfully prosecuted
and convicted when they don't. Connick is not the first case in
which the Supreme Court has closed off avenues of relief for
defendants who were victims of serious and deliberate
misconduct by prosecutors.86  Sanctions that theoretically could
be imposed on prosecutors for misconduct have been foreclosed,
especially by Supreme Court decisions enhancing the prosecutor's
broad immunity from civil liability. 7 Ironically, it might have
been easier for John Thompson to seek criminal charges against
his prosecutors for attempted murder than it was for him to sue
them civilly.
However, it is also possible that the majority's decision may
have a positive, albeit an unintended effect. Indeed, it may be
that in the context of examining the conduct of one of the worst
district attorney's offices in the country, the majority's paean to
lawyer competence and ethics may have a beneficial result. The
majority's astonishingly perverse and unrealistic view of lawyer
85. Supra note 66.
86. See, e.g., Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855 (2009) (absolute immunity
applies to administrative functions of district attorneys and chief supervisory
prosecutors for failing to institute training and supervision programs for assistants);
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 n.34 (1976) (absolute immunity afforded
prosecutors for advocacy activities such as soliciting a witness's false testimony and
suppressing exculpatory evidence).
87. See Bennett L. Gershman, Bad Faith Exception to Prosecutorial Immunity for
Brady Violations, Amicus, HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES LAW REVIEW
ONLINE (2010), http://harvardcrcl.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/GershmanPublish
.pdf.
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competence-especially the majority's assurance that young and
inexperienced prosecutors fresh out of law school are equipped
with the tools to know and implement their constitutional and
ethical disclosure obligations under Brady v. Maryland-may
actually encourage prosecutor's offices and individual prosecutors
to reflect about the need for Brady training. If that happens, then
John Thompson's tragic ordeal will not be lost.
APPENDIX
Brady Training Program
Course Syllabus
Required Reading
1. Relevant Supreme Court Decisions
There are at least twenty Supreme Court decisions
discussing in various contexts a prosecutor's Brady disclosure
obligation, i.e., what constitutes suppression of evidence,
standards for finding prejudice, disclosure of exculpatory and
impeachment evidence, solicitation and failing to correct false
testimony, using false evidence, and Brady's application to lost
and destroyed evidence. The most important of these decisions
should be included as part of the training materials.
The list of required reading should include the following
Supreme Court cases: United States Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976),
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), Kyles v. Whitley, 514
U.S. 419 (1995), Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004), Strickler v.
Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999), and Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769
(2009).
2. Professional Norms
The relevant professional norms should be part of a training
program. Training materials should include the ABA rules
specifically dealing with Brady disclosure, including both the
ABA Model Rules,8 8 and the ABA Prosecution Standards.8 9 Also
88. ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(d) (2008) ("The prosecutor in a
criminal case shall make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or
information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense").
89. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 3-3.11(a) (3d ed. 1993) ("A
prosecutor should not intentionally fail to make timely disclosure to the defense, at
the earliest feasible opportunity, of the existence of all evidence or information which
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included should be the familiar ethical rule, and commentary,
that articulates the prosecutor's overriding duty to serve the
cause of justice."0 It should be noted that the Supreme Court has
recognized these ethical rules as an important component in a
prosecutor's ethical duty under Brady."*
Class 1 - Legal Principles of Brady Jurisprudence
1. Brady Rule
The Brady rule, now nearly fifty years old, is essentially
unchanged, although its implementation has changed
considerably. Although the rule has been modified somewhat-a
specific request for Brady evidence is no longer necessary to
trigger the prosecutor's duty of disclosure-the standard of
materiality has changed from what used to be a rule requiring a
prosecutor to make a prediction concerning the relevance of the
evidence, to a retrospective judgment about whether an appellate
court will find a reasonable probability that the nondisclosure
materially prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial. Brady
disclosure covers both exculpatory evidence and impeachment
evidence. Under Brady, the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecutor is irrelevant. It should be noted that the yardstick for
disclosure stated by Connick, and endorsed by Justice Scalia-
"Disclose only what the law requires" 92 -does not represent the
Supreme Court's recommended approach to Brady, nor for that
matter, to the ethical standard requiring a prosecutor "to serve
justice."93
tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense charged or which
would tend to reduce the punishment of the accused").
90. ABA Model Rules, Rule 3.8, comment ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of
a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate"); ABA Standards, Standard
3-1.2 (b) ("The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict");
91. See Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1783 n.15 (2009) ("Although the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted by Brady, only
mandates the disclosure of material evidence, the obligation to disclose evidence
favorable to the defense may arise more broadly under a prosecutor's ethical or
statutory obligations. As we have often observed, the prudent prosecutor will err on
the side of transparency, resolving doubtful questions in favor of disclosure").
92. See transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 83, at 13 (noting that when
questioned about the deficiencies in Brady training in Connick's office, when
Thompson's lawyer criticized Connick's policy to disclose what the law requires and
"nothing more," Justice Scalia retorted: "Why wouldn't you start with that rule? The
rule is perfectly lawful; my goodness.").
93. Supra notes 86-89.
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2. Favorable Evidence
A prosecutor is required to disclose materially favorable
evidence. There is no obligation to disclose the entire case file,
although some prosecutors do in fact maintain an open file
policy.94 Determining whether certain evidence is favorable may
be a difficult task, especially since the prosecutor may not know
the theory of the defense, and the extent to which specific
evidence in the prosecutor's file is favorable. There are many
useful cases discussing the favorability requirement, including
some by the Supreme Court.9 5
3. Admissible Evidence
Admissibility of the evidence may be a precondition to
disclosure." However, this limitation should be tempered with
the qualification, recognized by several courts, that if the
inadmissible evidence may reasonably lead to admissible
evidence, then its inadmissibility should not be a bar to
disclosure." It should be noted that the U.S. Department of
Justice requires disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment
information regardless of whether the information subject to
disclosure would itself constitute admissible evidence. 98
4. Prosecutor's Knowledge - Actual and Constructive
Brady limits a prosecutor's disclosure duty to information
about which the prosecutor knows. In most of the cases - and the
Thompson case is illustrative - the prosecutor actually knows
that the evidence is favorable but decides not to disclose.
Situations arise, however, when the information is by other law
enforcement personnel, or other government agencies not part of
the investigation. The rule is clear that a prosecutor's knowledge
extends beyond his actual knowledge and includes constructive
knowledge of evidence about which a prosecutor "should know,"
including evidence possessed by police involved in the case, and
94. See, e.g., Strickler v. Green, 527 U.S. 263 (1999).
95. See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429
U.S. 545 (1977).
96. See, e.g., Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967); Wood v. Bartholomew, 516
U.S. 1 (1995).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 496 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2007); Ellsworth v.
Warden, 333 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003).
98. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorneys Manual, § 9-5.001(C)(3) (2006).
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other government agencies involved in the investigation. 9 9 A
prosecutor should examine all the police carefully, as well as alert
the police to disclose all information relevant to the case. Indeed,
for Brady the police are considered an "arm of the prosecutor,"'00
and have a derivative duty under Brady to turn over to the
prosecutor potentially exculpatory evidence.' 0 A prosecutor has
an affirmative duty to examine the personnel files of law
enforcement officers the prosecutor intends to call as witnesses,
and the criminal and corrections records of witnesses upon whose
testimony the prosecutor is relying.'0 2
5. Defendant's Knowledge
A prosecutor in general has no duty to disclose information
which the defense already knows about. Some courts go further
and hold that a prosecutor is not obligated to make disclosures of
information that the defense with reasonable diligence could have
obtained. However, this extension should be tempered with the
realization that even though information might be theoretically
available to the defense, it might not be available in fact for
purposes of Brady compliance. This might be the case where
public records are theoretically available, but there may have
been no reason for the defense to have looked for the record, or
cases in which the prosecution overwhelms the defense with
massive amounts of documents which are virtually impossible to
read and digest in the limited time available for pretrial
preparation.
6. Materiality of Undisclosed Evidence
A prosecutor's suppression of evidence violates due process
when the defendant shows that there is a reasonable probability
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.103 The test is not
whether the defendant would more likely than not have received
99. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436-38 (1995); Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
100. See Walker v. Lockhart, 763 F.2d 942, 958 (8th Cir. 1985).
101. See Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 381 (6th Cir. 2009)
("[V]irtually every other circuit has concluded either that the police share in the
state's obligations under Brady, or that the Constitution imposes on the police
obligations analogous to those recognized in Brady").
102. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 86 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 1996); Carriger v.
Stewart, 132 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 1997).
103. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 666 (1985).
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a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence
he received a fair trial, that is, "a trial resulting in a verdict
worthy of confidence."104 Materiality is analyzed by weighing the
significance of the witnesses and the evidence withheld and the
strength of the prosecution's case. A prosecutor's good or bad faith
in suppressing evidence is typically irrelevant to the materiality
analysis. Evidence that exculpates a defendant probably stands a
better chance of being found material than evidence that
impeaches the credibility of a witness. Materiality is determined
in terms of the suppressed evidence considered collectively, not
item by item. i05
7. Materiality of False Testimony
The Brady rule encompasses a prosecutor's use of false
testimony, either by soliciting the testimony from a witness, or
failing to correct a witness's false testimony. The Court has not
explained whether a prosecutor's nondisclosure of information
under Brady and a prosecutor's use of false testimony involve
separate claims, and need to be pleaded separately. In any event,
the Court has emphasized that a prosecutor using false testimony
may be a more serious violation of due process than suppressing
exculpatory evidence in that false testimony involves an actual
corruption of the truth-finding process. The test for determining
whether a conviction based on a prosecutor's knowing use of false
testimony violates due process is whether "there is any
reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected
the judgment of the jury."10 6
8. Significance of Request for Brady Evidence
Although Brady appeared to require a defense request for
favorable evidence, the requirement was subsequently
eliminated. Nevertheless, some courts continue to recognize
under Brady a distinction between suppressed evidence that has
been requested and suppressed evidence that has not been
requested. 107 Moreover, a prosecutor should also be alert to state
rules of disclosure that might impose on prosecutors a higher
standard of disclosure when the defense makes a specific request
104. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. at 434.
105. Id. at 436-37.
106. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
107. See Johnson v. Gibson, 164 F.3d 496, 510 (10th Cir. 1998).
2012] 537
Loyola Journal of Public Interest Law
for evidence than the standard under Brady.108
9. Timing and Late Disclosure of Brady Evidence
When must a prosecutor disclose Brady evidence? The
Supreme Court has not answered the question, although the
Court has noted that the disclosure duty is "ongoing." 09 Most
courts hold that Brady does not require pretrial disclosure.110 The
U.S. Department of Justice requires prosecutors to disclose
information "promptly after it is discovered," and to disclose
impeachment information "at a reasonable time before trial.""'
Local court rules may also impose specific time obligations for
disclosure." 2 The test for determining whether Brady
information was untimely is whether the delayed disclosure
prevented the defendant from using the material effectively in
preparing or presenting its case. 113
10. Lost and Destroyed Evidence
A prosecutor's disclosure duty includes a duty to preserve
such evidence from loss or destruction. Otherwise the disclosure
duty could easily be circumvented by destroying the evidence. A
prosecutor's duty to preserve evidence is limited to evidence that
might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's
defense, and must be of such nature that a defendant would be
unable to obtain comparable evidence.1 14 Moreover, there is no
denial of due process from the loss or destruction of potentially
useful evidence unless the defendant can show that the failure to
preserve evidence was in bad faith.1"
108. See People v. Vilardi, 555 N.E.2d 915 (N.Y. 1990) (describing the test for
reversal following prosecutor's suppression of evidence that was specifically
requested is whether there is a "reasonable possibility" that undisclosed evidence
would have influenced the jury's verdict).
109. See Pennsylvania. v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987).
110. See United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 144 (2d Cir. 2001).
111. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorneys Manual § 9-5.001(D)(1)(2) (2006)
244, fn 11.
112. See infra note 111.
113. Several convictions have been reversed for untimely disclosure. See, e.g., Leka
v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2001); DiSimone v. Phillips, 461 F.3d 181 (2d Cir.
2006).
114. See Cal. v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984).
115. See Ariz. v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988).
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11. Work Product
Whether the prosecutor's work product must be disclosed
under Brady appears to be an open question that the Supreme
Court has not addressed. Most courts have held that Brady does
not require a prosecutor to disclose to the defense "opinion work
product" that encompasses the prosecutor's mental impressions
or legal theories.1 1 6 However, if a prosecutor's opinion and mental
impressions do contain underlying exculpatory facts, then
disclosure of those facts may be required under Brady. "
Class 2 - Procedural and Systemic Issues
1. Procedural Framework
Brady disclosure is not automatic. Prosecutors typically are
required to provide Brady evidence upon request. Some
prosecutors disclose Brady evidence early in the proceedings,
along with their disclosure of other discovery materials. Most
federal and state jurisdictions do not mandate disclosure within a
specific time period, nor do they specify any due diligence
requirements upon prosecutors.' 8 Prosecutors can disclose in one
of several ways: prosecutors may furnish a defendant with all
evidence specifically required by the discovery rules; prosecutors
may disclose their entire case file, and all potential Brady
evidence; and prosecutors may seek the court's assistance in
determining whether and to what extent to comply with Brady.
The Brady duty is a continuing one, and a prosecutor is obligated
to disclose Brady evidence when he learns about it.
2. Judicial Involvement in Brady Determination
May a defendant obtain pretrial judicial inspection of a
prosecutor's file to determine whether a prosecutor is withholding
Brady information? Although the Supreme Court has suggested
this possibility," there are obvious practical difficulties since a
judge is less oriented to the facts and possible defenses than the
116. See, e.g., Morris v. Ylst, 447 F.3d 735, 742-43 (9th Cir. 2006); Williamson v.
Moore, 221 F.3d 1177, 1182 (11th Cir. 2000).
117. See Morris, 447 F.3d at 742.
118. See generally, LAURAL L. HOOPER ET AL., TREATMENT OF BRADY V. MARYLAND
MATERIAL IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT AND STATE COURTS' RULES, ORDERS, AND
POLICIES, REPORT To THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, (Federal Judicial Center, 2004).
119. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976).
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attorneys and might not be able to make an informed decision.
However, if a prosecutor entertains a genuine doubt as to
whether certain information should be disclosed, or a defendant
makes a preliminary showing that obviously favorable material is
being withheld, it may be appropriate for the court to review the
material in camera.120
3. Post-Conviction Disclosure
If a prosecutor discovers Brady evidence after a defendant's
conviction, does a prosecutor have a duty of disclosure? Whether
the Brady duty extends to evidence discovered after the trial is
unclear. Courts appear to disagree on whether the appropriate
analytical approach is under Brady, or a claim for wrongful
imprisonment, or deprivation of liberty without due process. The
ABA Model Rules impose an ethical duty on prosecutors to rectify
wrongful convictions.121 When a prosecutor learns of "new,
credible, and material evidence" that creates a "reasonable
likelihood" that a defendant is innocent, a prosecutor must
promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant and the court, as
well as conduct an investigation. When a prosecutor learns of
"clear and convincing evidence" that shows that a convicted
defendant is innocent, the prosecutor "shall seek to remedy the
conviction." The commentary indicates that a prosecutor's
"independent judgment, made in good faith," that the evidence is
not of such nature as to trigger the disclosure obligations, even if
erroneous, does not constitute a violation of the Rule.
4. Application of Brady to Guilty Pleas
The Supreme Court has ruled that a prosecutor is not
required to disclose to a defendant contemplating whether to
plead guilty information the defense could use at trial to impeach
government witnesses.1 2 2 The Court has not ruled on whether a
prosecutor is required to disclose exculpatory information.
Several courts have held that a prosecutor may not withhold
exculpatory information from a defendant during plea
negotiations on the ground that such information is critical to
enable a defendant to make an intelligent decision on whether to
120. See United States v. Service Deli, Inc., 151 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 1998).
121. See ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.8 (g), (h), and comment
9.
122. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002).
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plead guilty. 12 3
5. Innocence and Wrongful Convictions
Prosecutors should be made aware of the consequences of a
Brady violation, namely, that nondisclosure of exculpatory
evidence may result in the conviction of an innocent person, as in
the case of John Thompson. Prosecutors should be instructed that
the Brady rule is unique in many ways. Of all the procedural
rules that prosecutors must observe, the Brady rule alone
imposes on prosecutors a positive duty of fairness. Prosecutors
should be told how easy it is to avoid and evade Brady's
requirements, the considerable challenge facing the prosecutor in
disclosing evidence that might impair the prosecutor's chances of
winning a conviction, and the consequences to the accused, the
prosecutor, and the cause of justice in violating the rule.
6. Cognitive Biases
In connection with the previous point, prosecutors might be
alerted to their considerable discretion in deciding what items of
evidence might be plausibly subject to disclosure, and whether in
fact to make the disclosure. It might be useful to acquaint
prosecutors with the increasing body of literature discussing the
various cognitive biases that might impact on a prosecutor's
disclosure decision. 124 Prosecutors should be alerted that these
biases often operate unconsciously, and may impede the ability of
prosecutors to maintain the neutrality and objectivity that
compliance with Brady requires. However, as noted above, the
Supreme Court has observed that a prudent prosecutor should
resolve doubts in favor of disclosure. 12 5
Class 3 - Specific Types of Brady Evidence
1. Eyewitness Misidentifications
123. See, e.g., Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 293 (1st Cir. 2006); Matthew
v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 364 (5th Cir. 2000).
124. See Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision-Making: Some Lessons
of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587 (2006); Keith A. Findley &
Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006
WIs. L. REV. 291 (2006); Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One's Convictions: The Prosecutor
and Tunnel Vision, 49 HOw. L. J. 475 (2006).
125. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995) ("a prosecutor anxious about
tacking too close to the wind will disclose a favorable piece of evidence"); United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976) ("[T]he prudent prosecutor will resolve
doubtful questions in favor of disclosure").
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Evidence of eyewitness misidentifications is a staple of the
Brady cases. 12 6 Numerous cases of mistaken identifications have
resulted in the conviction of innocent persons, and several of
these cases, including decisions by the Supreme Court, have
focused on the prosecutor's nondisclosure of evidence that would
have exposed erroneous identifications. Prosecutors should be
familiar with the fact that eyewitness misidentifications account
for the large majority of wrongful convictions, and the increasing
body of research addressing the reasons why eyewitnesses make
mistakes.
2. Cooperation Agreements - Explicit and Tacit
Cooperation agreements between the prosecutor and his
witness, which typically confers advantages to the witness, are
commonplace. Prosecutors are required to disclose these
agreements so that a jury can determine whether a witness's
testimony was influenced by the agreement. Several of the Brady
cases in the Supreme Court involve the failure of the prosecutor
to disclose the nature or extent of a cooperation agreement, and
even involve actions of prosecutors in hiding the existence of such
agreements. 127 Prosecutors also have been found to violate Brady
by conferring benefits on a witness tacitly.
3. Scientific Tests and Reports
Scientific evidence can be the most powerful evidence used
by prosecutors to get convictions, but also may be the most
powerful evidence to exonerate a wrongfully accused defendant,
as in the Connick case. There are numerous instances in which
prosecutors violated Brady by failing to disclosure exculpatory
scientific evidence. 12 8 Prosecutors should be aware of the
methods, standards, and protocols of the laboratories and experts
opining on the scientific evidence, and should also be aware that
nondisclosure of deficiencies or errors may violate Brady.
126. See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.
419 (1995).
127. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
128. See, e.g., Schledwitz v. United States, 169 F.3d 1003 (6th Cir. 1999) (expert
report); Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457 (11th Cir. 1986) (ballistics evidence);
Barbee v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964); Miller v. State,
809 P.2d 1317 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (forensic chemist's report); McCarty v. State,
765 P.2d 1215 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (forensic chemist's report).
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4. Physical Evidence
Discovery statutes typically require prosecutors to disclose to
defendants physical evidence connected with the criminal charge.
As we saw in Connick, physical evidence which might be critical
to guilt or innocence may be hidden, intentionally or
inadvertently. This is another instance where the prosecutor has
to ensure that police and other investigative agencies disclose to
the prosecutor all of the relevant physical evidence acquired
during the investigation that either incriminates, exonerates, or
may even be neutral. Indeed, seemingly neutral physical evidence
may be relevant to enable defense to investigate and present its
case effectively. 129
5. Third-Party Guilt
Claims by defendants that a third party committed the crime
are not infrequent, and prosecutors occasionally have information
pointing to guilt of a third party, and disclosure of this
information may be required. There are many cases, including
several decisions by the Supreme Court, in which a prosecutor
possessed evidence pointing to the guilt of a third party.130
6. Witness Background and Impeachment
A witness's criminal history is considered favorable
information that a prosecutor is required to disclose. The
information can be used to impeach the credibility of a
prosecution witness. Thus, records of a witness's arrest,
conviction, and conduct in prison are typically the kinds of
information that prosecutors must disclose. The failure of
prosecutors to disclose this information has resulted in the
reversal of convictions.
7. Defective Investigation
Disclosure of the defects in a criminal investigation might be
favorable information that a prosecutor must disclose. The fact
that investigators did not pursue certain courses of action,
interview certain witnesses, or seek to obtain certain types of
129. It may be that the failure to find forensic evidence linked to the defendant in
a place where it would likely be found under the prosecutor's theory might be viewed
as favorable and possibly material exculpatory and therefore might be subject to
disclosure.
130. See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.419
(1995).
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scientific or other evidence in particular cases might be
considered exculpatory evidence.131
8. False Evidence
Use by a prosecutor of false evidence, either through a
witness's false testimony or the use of other false evidence,
violates due process. The nondisclosure by the prosecutor of this
evidence is a frequent basis for reversing convictions under
Brady.132
Class 4 - Application: Specific Brady Problems for
Analysis and Discussion
Problem 1
Defendant Thomas has been charged with sale of drugs to
Detective Musgrove, an undercover officer assigned to the
narcotics unit in the sheriffs office. Seated in a parked vehicle to
observe and back up Musgrove's purchase is Detective Franklin.
According to Musgrove, he approached Thomas, whom he knew
from the streets as a drug dealer with a long record of drug
convictions, and purchased a quantity of cocaine from him for
$100 dollars. Thomas denies the sale, and claims an alibi. He also
alleges that he and Musgrove knew each other, and that
Musgrove had once asked Thomas to sell drugs for him, and
Thomas refused, thereby, according to Thomas, providing
Musgrove with a motive to seek retribution. As the prosecutor
prepares the case for trial, he is informed by Musgrove that he is
under investigation by federal law enforcement authorities for
threatening, shaking down, and otherwise co-opting local drug
dealers. He advises the prosecutor that he is innocent and there
is no basis for the charges. Assume that the prosecutor did not
know that Musgrove was under investigation at the time he
prosecuted Thomas and that Thomas is convicted. Assume
further that after Thomas was convicted, Musgrove was indicted,
tried, and convicted of conspiracy to obstruct justice.
Does the prosecutor have an obligation under Brady v.
Maryland to disclose to the defense that Musgrove is under
federal investigation? If so, when should the prosecutors disclose?
131. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
132. See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Banks v. Dretke, 540
U.S. 669 (2004); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Youngblood v. West Virginia,
547 U.S. 867 (2006).
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Does Thomas have a remedy under Brady v. Maryland?
Problem 2
Defendant D has been charged with forcible rape. According
to the testimony of the complainant V, she was on the side of a
road after her car broke down, when D drove up and offered to
help her. It was a chilly winter evening, and D told her to wait in
his car to stay warm. After looking at her car and checking the
engine, he told her she probably needed to be towed, and there
was a service station down the road. He then drove a short
distance away, stopped, held a knife to her throat, bound her
wrists behind her back, and raped her. When he produced the
knife, she cut her finger when she held up her hand to ward off
the attack, and bled on her clothes and car seat. After the attack,
he threatened to kill her if she called the police, but drove her to a
friend's home, where the police were called. The police took a
statement from V and brought her to a hospital. The examining
doctor saw a cut on her finger which was consistent with being
cut with as sharp object, and bruising on her wrists which was
consistent with binding by a rope. Two weeks later, V was shown
a series of photographs by the police and identified D. The police
arrested D and searched his car where they found a knife, a rope,
and blood on the front seat. A forensic chemist performed serology
tests on the knife and the car seat. In her report, the forensic
chemist concluded that the blood type on the knife and the car
seat was different than V's blood type. The prosecutor did not
disclose the chemist's report to the defense. The prosecutor in its
case-in-chief chose not to introduce any evidence of blood stains.
Assume the prosecutor's reason for neither introducing the
chemist's report nor calling the chemist as a witness was because
she believed the chemist was incompetent-he had twice failed
proficiency tests, used inappropriate tests in analyzing the blood,
used an insufficient number of samples, failed to follow proper
procedures.
Did the prosecutor's failure to disclose the chemist's report
violate Brady v. Maryland?
Problem 3
Defendant D was charged with capital murder. The
prosecution's theory of guilt was that D and his girlfriend G
hitched a ride in a van driven by V. The three drove to a campsite
where they planned to camp out for the night. During the night,
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D killed V by hitting him several times in the head with a rock,
and then dumping his body down an embankment. G then
cleaned the van and burned some bloody clothing and blankets. D
and G then drove the van through several states using V's credit
card to make purchases. Along the way, they picked up a
hitchhiker H to whom D confessed to killing V. H fled, notified
the police, and D and G were arrested. D confessed to police that
he murdered V. G made a cooperation agreement with the
prosecutor and testified against D. D also testified, claiming that
G killed V after he tried to rape her. D testified that he falsely
confessed to the murder to protect G, whom he thought was
pregnant with his child. G was heavily cross-examined. She
contradicted herself in several places and admitted she lied in the
past. Following her testimony, a legal intern in the prosecutor's
office, who participated in the trial preparation and interviews of
witnesses, including G, prepared a status report for the
prosecutor in which she wrote: "G perjured herself at trial.
Awaiting the transcripts to determine exactly what she said."
This report was never disclosed to the defense. After D was found
guilty and sentenced to death, G pleaded guilty to "grand theft
auto." The plea agreement with G originally specified that G's
representation that she had not inflicted any injuries on V had to
be truthful. This condition was deleted before D's trial.
Does Brady v. Maryland require the prosecutor to disclose
the intern's status report?
Problem 4
Defendants Art and Bill, 18 and 20 years old respectively,
were charged with robbery and murder. The principal witness
against them was Hal, a teenager who knew the defendants from
the neighborhood. According to Hal's testimony presented during
the prosecution's case-in-chief, Hal was riding his bicycle when he
saw Art and Bill accost Mike as he left a senior citizens home.
Mike started running away, and Art and Bill gave chase, at one
point passing Hal and asking to use his bicycle, and when Hal
refused, they took it and finally caught up with Mike. Art and Bill
started to beat Mike, repeatedly kicking him in his face and side,
and struck him several times in the head with the bicycle. Hal
also saw Art and Bill take Mike's wallet. After Hal retrieved his
bicycle, he was ordered by Art and Bill to say nothing. Hal
eventually was questioned by the police, and he reported the
event, leading to the arrests of Art and Bill. Hal identified the
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defendants in court. Cross-examination of Hal suggested that the
police initially suspected Hal of being involved in the attack. A
detective testified that Hal was merely a witness, although
certain aspects of the interrogation of Hal raised doubts about
this assertion. The defense called several witnesses: one witness
testified that he saw Hal hitting Mike with his bicycle, and
another witness testified that he saw Hal running away with
several other youths, none of whom was Art or Bill; and another
who testified to an alibi for Art and Bill. Two alibi witnesses also
testified for the defense. Sally, Bill's girlfriend, testified that she
was at her home with Bill at the time of the attack. Sally's sister,
Jan, corroborated this account. The prosecutor had in its file an
investigative report of an interview with Jan four days before the
trial. According to the investigative report, Jan stated that Hal
had been bragging to people about what he and his friends had
done to Mike, and also that Hal told another acquaintance,
Frank, that he implicated Art and Bill so that he would not get
into trouble. Jan was interviewed by the defense a month before
the trial. The defense did not elicit these statements of Hal's.
Does Brady v. Maryland require the prosecution to disclose
to the defense the investigative report containing Jan's interview?
Problem 5
Defendant D paid C $50,000 to burn down his warehouse so
that D could recover the insurance proceeds. C attempted to set
fire to the premises, but the fire did not ignite. Three years later,
C was charged with narcotics violations by state authorities.
During debriefing by state investigators, C disclosed his
involvement in the arson, which information was transmitted to
federal authorities, and D was indicted for attempted arson. At
D's trial, C testified that he had been given immunity for his
testimony against D. C also told the jury that his testimony
against D would have no bearing on his state narcotics charges,
asserting that the cases had nothing to do with each other. He did
acknowledge that an investigator involved in the federal arson
case had arrested him on the state narcotics charge. However, it
appears that C did in fact expect leniency and a forthcoming plea
agreement in connection with the state charges against him, with
the agreement of the state prosecutor. The state prosecutor also
expected that C's cooperation in the federal case would be
considered in the state plea agreement. Proceedings on the state
charges were adjourned several times pending resolution of the
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federal matter.
Did the federal prosecutor violate Brady v. Maryland when C
stated that his testimony against D would have no bearing on his
state charges?
Problem 6
V was shot twice in the chest as he was getting into his car
in the parking lot of a shopping center by an assailant who fired
the shots from the roof of the shopping center. The prosecution's
evidence convicting D of the murder was largely circumstantial.
Two eyewitnesses saw a man jump from the roof and run towards
a nearby park. They described him as young, wearing a grey or
blue cap, and a brownish coat. One of these witnesses said his
pants were wet, but could not identify D as the man. The other
witness believed D "looked something like" the man he saw. V
was D's supervisor in the post office mail room, and witnesses
testified to a heated relationship between them, and that D was
given a poor performance review the week before V's death. The
murder weapon was found in a park adjacent to a creek. A
witness testified that he had loaned D the weapon the previous
year and had asked for it back but D said it had been stolen. D
was arrested within hours of the shooting. His shoes and trousers
were wet. The police found a tan raincoat and a gray cap under a
bush in the park. Assume that the prosecution asked the FBI
crime lab to scientifically test the gun, coat, cap, shoes, and
clothing worn by defendant. Tests to establish whether the hat
and coat found under the bush had been associated with D, or a
firearm, or with paint samples taken from the shopping center
were negative. There were no fingerprints on the murder weapon.
Soil samples taken from D's shoes did not match the escape route,
nor was tar found on D's shoes able to be matched with tar on the
shopping center roof.
Does Brady v. Maryland require the prosecutor to disclose to
the defense the results of these tests?
Problem 7
B, a ten-year-old boy, was transferred from residential
treatment facility R to residential treatment facility Y. While at
Y, B accused staff member D of sexually assaulting him during
several encounters. D was charged and tried, where the evidence
consisted mostly of B's accusations and D's denials. An intake
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note written by Y's Director of the Program for Emotionally
Disturbed Boys indicated that B alleged that he was abused by
staff members at his former facility R where he had stayed for
several months prior to Y, that B expressed concern that he
would be assaulted at Y, and that Y would need to take special
precautions to protect staff members from false accusations if B
was admitted.
Does Brady v. Maryland require the prosecutor to disclose
this intake note to the defense?
Problem 8
Dan, along with Ed and Fred, were charged with robbing an
auto supply store and killing the clerk. At Dan's capital murder
trial, Sally, who had a child with Dan, testified that Dan told her
he robbed an auto store with Ed and Fred and killed someone. Ed
testified that he would plead guilty to a lesser degree of murder -
murder in the second degree-and testified for the government
that he drove Dan and Fred to the store in his blue Ford, and
waited outside. Fred also testified for the government that he
would plead guilty to the non-capital charge of murder in the first
degree, and testified that when he left the store Dan had taken
the clerk to a back room, and when Dan exited the store he stated
that he "took care of the person." The bullet that killed the clerk
was fired from a revolver recovered from the ground next to an
apartment complex where Dan lived with his girlfriend. Assume
that the prosecutor possessed the following items of evidence
which were not disclosed to Dan's lawyer: (1) a statement to the
police from witness W who left the auto store and saw three men
sitting in a blue car, and after viewing a photo spread, identified
Mike as one of the men in the car (the prosecutor did not charge
Mike, believing that W had misidentified him); (2) a police report
of an interview with Mike's girlfriend who stated that Mike's gun
was used to kill the clerk in the auto store robbery; (3) that Sally
had a history of poor mental health and drug use; and (4) that
Fred perjured himself when he testified that he planned to plead
guilty to first degree murder when in fact he pleaded guilty to
second degree murder.
Does Brady v. Maryland require the prosecutor to disclose
these items to the defense?
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